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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we investigate the impact of demand uncertainty on the choice of plant capacity by a regulated firm. Over the past few years, demand uncertainty has become a major element in the decision-making of utilities, and particularly in their decision-making with respect to capacity choices. In a recent study by SRI [1977] , it was reported that to maximize expected consumers' surplus, more generating capacity was required for the electric utility industry when operating under demand uncertainty than under demand certainty.1 This finding raises the question whether the structure of rate regulation of electric utilities provides the appropriate incentives for them to invest in more capacity under demand uncertainty then under certainty. The present paper addresses such questions.
The model of the regulated firm that is employed in this paper derives from the work of Joskow [1974] concerning the recent history of rate regulation in the electric utility industry. Briefly, Joskow reported that during the 1960s and the early 1970s, the impetus for rate reviews in the electric utility industry came mainly from the utilities and not from the public utility commissions (PUC's).
Joskow's findings are corroborated by data for the period . A study of all rate cases involving electric utilities in the U.S. for that period shows that of a total of 363 cases, 350 of these were instances of utility-initiated rate reviews and only 13 were cases of PUC-initiated reviews.2 From the point-of-view of the formal theory of the regulated firm, this strongly suggests that the Averch-Johnson model of a firm operating at or near an "allowed rate of return constraint" (with the allowed rate of return being in excess of the cost of capital to the firm) should be replaced by a model of price regulation in which attention is shifted to the "non-negativity of profits constraint", or, at least, this should be done with respect to the electric utility industry. With some elaborations, this is basically what we do in this paper, building on the approach adopted in a recent paper on a related topic.3
A MODEL OF THE REGULATED FIRM
We posit a regulatory environment in which the PUC adopts an average cost pricing rule, under which the goal of regulation is to set prices for the regulated firm so that the firm earns just the market rate of return (the cost of capital) on its assets. We will ignore the difficulties that arise in attempting to determine a measure of the cost of capital, or in deciding on just which assets qualify for incltision in the rate base of the firm and how they should be valued.
Let q denote quantity demanded for the regulated firm and let P denote the price per unit of output. K is the value of the capital employed by the firm (taken to be the same as the rate base of the firm), and L is a measure of the variable inputs employed by the firm. r is the rental per dollar of capital for the firm, and w is the cost per unit of the variable input. Profits denoted by 2t, are given by (1) r= Pq-wL-rK.
Ideally, to achieve its objective, the PUC would choose P so that 2r=0; that is, the PUC would act to set price equal to average cost. However, the PUC has neither the resources to engage in rate making on a continuous basis nor the incentive to do so. Following Joskow, we view the PUC as basically a passive agency, acting only when pressured to action. It acts to raise P when petitioned by a firm operating at a loss, and it acts to lower P when petitioned by consumer groups who can demonstrate that there are excessive profits on the part of the firm. Thus, regulatory review is triggered by either of two events:
(2) t < O or 7 > sK.
In this statement, s is some strictly positive rate of return sufficiently high so that the potential gains to consumer groups from rate review more than compensate for the organizational costs of putting together an effective intervention effort in the rate making process. s is not the "allowed rate of return" or the "fair rate of return" that is debated in regulatory hearings -the allowed or fair rate of return is r; the PUC engages in average cost pricing when it prices.4
Because the PUC uses average cost pricing whenever it sets prices at a formal regulatory hearing, there are strong incentives for regulated firms to avoid PUC instituted rate reviews called in response to protests by consumer groups. In fact, it makes sense for the regulated firm to institute review proceedings to reduce output prices when it appears that profits at the existing prices will exceed sK.
By so doing, it avoids a confrontation with intervenors and has a better chance of preserving profits above the cost of capital. In fact, the data on Tate hearings bear out this view of the regulatory process, as shown in Table 1 . Source: These data were supplied by Donna Berry of Caltech, and are derived from Public Utility Reports.
Note that PUC initiated rate reviews were relatively rare, even during the 1948-1967 period when electric rates were falling for most of the country. In fact, Table 1 shows that company initiated reviews for rate decreases -while also rare -were more frequent than PUC initiated reviews. (All PUC initiated reviews were aimed at rate decreases). We should also point out that the steady fall in electric rates during the 1950s and 1960s -from an average rate of 2.77 cents per kwh in 1952 to a historic low of 2.10 cents per kwh in 1970-reflected in part "automatic" price decreases due to the declining block tariff structure of electricity prices together with the operation of fuel cost pass through rules. As
Joskow has noted, consumer groups are no doubt more concerned with the average cost of electricity than with profits of utilities. In a more sophisticated version of our model, s would be taken to be a function of P to reflect this concern.
Briefly, our model of the regulatory process is one in which firms are the active participants and the PUC is passive. The firm petitions for a rate increase when profits are negative and receives an increase sufficient to achieve a zero profit level.
The firm petitions for a rate decrease when profits exceed sK and receives a decrease sufficient to achieve the level sK, thus avoiding a PUC initiated review that would reduce profits to zero.
The model of this paper thus differs fundamentally from those employed in the traditional Averch-Johnson literature,5 and from those appearing in the more recent literature on demand uncertainty.6 We regard the regulated firm as subject to price regulation; the PUC (and not the firm) chooses the product price, in an environment in which both the non-negativity of profits constraint and a 5 See for example, Averch and Johnson [1962] , Bailey [1973] , and Baumol and Klevorick [1970] .
variant of the allowed rate of return constraint are relevant to the decisionmaking process of the utility. However, in recent years, it is certainly the nonnegativity of profits, rather than the upper bound constraint, that has been binding. Moreover, our interpretation of the upper bound constraint is quite different from that of the traditional A-J literature.
To be explicit about both of these differences, consider an A-J approach applied to the case of a firm operating with certainty as to demand. The firm faces a given price set by the PUC, which is high enough to guarantee non-negative profits for the firm. Quantity is known once price is set. Then the regulated firm would choose its inputs, K and L, to maximize profit, subject to the upper bound on profits (ic < sK) that the firm wants to satisfy in order to avoid triggering a rate review.
In the special case where the upper profit constraint is binding, then an A-J bias does occur.7 But this is only a special case, since the price set by regulators may not generally allow the firm to earn profits great enough to reach the upper constraint. If, at the existing regulatory price, 2t <sK for all choices of K and L, then the regulated firm will produce the required level of output in a cost minimizing fashion, i.e., it will operate on its efficient expansion path.
When we turn to the case of unicertainty, things are somewhat more complicated. Peles and Stein [1976] analyze an A-J type firm, showing that under additive uncertainty affecting demand the regulated firm chooses a larger stock of capital than the unregulated monopolist. But, under multiplicative uncertainty, the closer the allowed rate of return is to the actual cost of capital, the smaller the stock of capital. Perrakis [February, 1976 ] employs a similar model to show that under uncertainty the regulated firm will operate with excess capacity for some levels of demand, and that ex ante expected profits are less than the maximum allowed by regulators. In a later paper, Perrakis [June, 1976] extends his results to show that generally the A-J effect does not hold under uncertainty for arbitrary demand functions and probability distributions over disturbances, either in the case of risk neutral or risk averse firms. Pindyck [1980] presents a multiperiod A-J model in which uncertainty again leads to ambiguity as to overcapitalization of costs.
The treatment to be presented here arrives at results similar to those summarized above; there is ambiguity about the relative capitalization levels under certainty and uncertainty and with respect to regulated and unregulated firms.
But, the nature of the model leads to quite differ-ent explanations for the ambiguity.
In particular, if a regulated firm operating near the zero profit constraint faces an unexpectedly unfavorable demand or increase in costs, the firm can rely on the PUC to increase price to eliminate losses. Further, given a firm operating near the zero profit point, favorable demand or cost outcomes can lead to positive profits that, within limits, can be captured by the firm. Burness, Montgomery, and Quirk [1980] arrive at the conclusion that expected profit maximizing regulated firms tend to prefer risky (cost-plus) construction contracts for capital goods to safe (turnkey) contracts with the same expected cost.8 These incentives are reversed when the firm operates near the allowed rate of return level, as is assumed in A-J models. The data in Table 1 clearly show that any model that concentrates on the upper bound profit constraint has serious flaws when used to explain the behavior of regulated electric utilities in the 1960's and 1970's.
The special features that characterize this model under demand uncertainty are taken up in the next section.
DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND THE CHOICE OF CAPACITY
We next consider a decision-making environment for the firm in which demand is uncertain. The firm must choose its stock of capital K before demand is observed. It operates under a common carrier obligation so that output must be large enough to satisfy the quantity demanded. Thus, after demand is observed, the variable input L is chosen so as to satisfy the common carrier requirement.
Let 4(K, L) denote the production function for the firm, where 0 is strictly quasiconcave with positive marginal products and with third order differentiability.
Let x denote the values of a random variable that enters the demand function for output in a monotone increasing fashion, so that q = q(x, P) where a q aq Ox ap <0. Let f(x) be the pdf over x, while F(x) is the cumulative distribution function.
Given P, theni once x is observed, q is determined as well. Then the firm must satisfy the common carrier requirement (3).
Since L is chosen after q is observed, in such a way as to satisfy (3), it follows that (4) L= L(q, K), where 4(K, L(q, K)) = q.
Given the price P, the choice of capital K, the level of demand q, and the choice of the variable input L, profits for the firm are given by (5) m(p, K, q) = Pq -wL(q, K) -rK, where q(x, P)=O(K, L(q, K)).
We assume that regulatory price adjustment occurs instantaneously, i.e., we ignore regulatory lag. Let P0 be the initial price facing the firm. The firm chooses K to maximize expected profits before the random variable x is observed. Once x is observed, then the price is adjusted instantaneously by the following rule:
P0, if 0 < mr(PO, K, q) < sK (no rate change) (6) P = P1 if 7r(PO, K, q) < 0 (firm seeks higher rate) P25 if 7c(PO, K, q) > sK (firm seeks lower rate).
In (6), P1 is defined by 7r(P1, K, q(x, P1))=0 and P2 by 0(P2, K, q(x, P2))=s
We assume that the regulated price is always set on an inelastic region of demand so that it is always possible to increase profits for the firm by increasing its price.
Given K and P0, define qi(K, P0), i=0, 1, 2, 3, by r(PO, K, q?) = m(PO, K, q3) = 0, q3 > qo (7) m(PO, K, ql) -= (PO, K, q2) = sK, q2 > ql.
Further, let xi(Po, K), i = 0, 1, 2, 3, be those values of x such that q? = q(xO, PO), q = q(xl, PO), q2 = q(X2, PO), and q3 = q(x3, PO). Figure 1 where from (3), we ha q < q, ai/aq < 0 for q > q. Further, (9_2 =L a 2 LL < 0 (9) ~ ~ ~~qaq 2 assuming ILL = a24/aL2 <0, as we do.
Finally, we assume that the firm is an expected profit maximizer, taking into account in its choice of capital the regulatory price adjustments summarized in (6).
Then the problem of the firm becomes:
By the price adjustment rule (6), the first and last integrals are identically zero, while the third integral is simply sK[F(x2)-F(x1)]. Thus, the first order condition for maximizing Wmay be written as
(1 1)
where 7CK= a7/aK and K is the optimal choice of K defined by a solution to (11).9
In the work that follows, we will assume in addition that a regular max occurs, that is, 7KK < O?
UNCERTAINTY AND THE A-J CAPITALIZATION BIAS
In contrast to the choice of capital for the regulated firm according to (11), we might consider the choice of K and Lby an unregulated monopolist. Employing the same timing assumptions as above, the unregulated monopolist chooses K before x is known. After x is observed, the unregulated monopolist chooses P, which determines q, and then picks L to satisfy b(K, L) = q. Clearly there is no unambiguous general result concerning an overcapitalization bias, independent of the functional forms off(x), 0, and q(x, P), and of the value of PO. In particular, as we have seen earlier, if PO is such that r(PO, x1, K)=sK for some K withf(x) a spike concentrating all probabilities at x1, then an A-J bias arises (assuming 0 is concave in L). And if max mr(PO, x, K) = 7r satisfies 0 < 7 < sK K for some x then there is no A-J bias when all probabilities are concentrated at that value of x. Indeterminacy of bias given the certainty case implies indeterminancy under uncertainty.
UNCERTAINTY AND PLANT SIZE
Consider the profit function for the regulated firm, where we incorporate into the profit function the price adjustments that occur under the regulatory process (6). Let this function be denoted by r*(q, K). Then 7r*(q, K) is given by where LK= -1KIkL. Then it follows that 0 if q < q? or q > q3orq' < q < q2
(18) 7tKq= -wLKq if q? < q < ql or q2 < q < q3
where LKq =3-(ILKL-K1LL)kkL
In the general case, LKq is of indeterminate sign. However, if capital is a normal input, then LK <0 and the graph of 7rK as a function of q appears as in Figure 3 . Over the ranges (qO, ql) and (q2, q3), ir is increasing. However, there is no presumption that the right and left-hand limits of 1rT evaluated at any switching point (qO, ql, q2, q3) are equal. Thus, the jump discontinuities and general shape of the graph illustrate a "typical" situation so far as the 7T* function is concerned. Finally, we note that the curvature of the 7u* function over the intervals (qO, ql) and (q2, q3) depends on the sign of We are now in a position to compare the choice of capital by a regulated firm operating under uncertainty with its choice under certainty. As we have seen, under uncertainty, the firm chooses K k so that Wk=0, that is, Ef 7E(q, J) = 0 or wEfLk = Under certainty, with demand given by q-=Ef(q), the choice of the regulated firm is K=K such that 7r*(Ef(q; K), K)=0. By hypothesis, WKK<O (there is a regular max) and further, 7TKK <0 SO that TCKK <0 where it is defined. Thus, we have an unambiguous ordering over the amounts of capital chosen iff 0 = 7k(Ef(q; K), K) < Efg*(q, K)< iK > K (20) or, O = 7r*(Ef(q; K), K) > Efg*(q, K) K < K. By Jensen's Inequality, 7rc(Ef(q)) ? Ef1g(q) for all probability density functions f iff 7r is concave in q (and the inequality is reversed for all pdf's f iff 7T is convex in q). Since 7C*qq is generally ambiguous in sign over the intervals (qO, ql) and (q2, q3), and because of the other characteristics of 7r* as shown in Figure 3 and uncertainty depend upon the specific properties of the production function and the probability densityfunction over quantity demanded.
The interpretation of this proposition is best shown by reference to Fig. 3, which shows how the marginal profitability of capital (nt*) varies with quantity, which is uncertain. The regulatory system itself introduces discontinuities, so that 7T* will generally be neither concave nor convex in quantity, which is why it is generally not possible to rank the choices of capital under certainty and uncertainty.
This raises the general question as to whether there are interesting conditions under which uncertainty has no effect on plant size. This occurs when given K1, the choice of capital under uncertainty, the probability density function is positive only over regions in which 7TKqq iS zero. Formally, let 40, q,2, q satisfy condition (7) given K = K. Let qL=inf {qI q = q(x, PO) with f(x) > O} and q1, and sup {q I q = q(x, PO) with f (x) > 0}. If the firm's probability density function over demand is such that q1,< 40 or qL> 43, then it is clear from inspection of Figure 2 and Figure 3 that profits are zero for every q such that q = q(x, PO) with f(x) >0 and 7Kqq iS zero for every such q as well. In these cases the choice of capital under certainty is indeterminate, since profits are zero for all possible choices of capital. Hence, there is no definite ordering over capacity choice (certainty versus uncertainty) in these cases.
for every q such that q = q(x, PO) with f(x as indicated by Figure 3 . Then by Jensen's Inequality we would have Ef(n*(q), K) = 7r*(Ef(q), K). Under these conditions, the firm chooses K( = K) as the largest value of K such that 7r(q, K) = sK for all q satisfying q = q(x, PO) with f(x)>0.
Thus, the choice of K would be the same under certainty as under uncertainty.
However, the argument fails because it can not be the case that 41 < < qLq ? q Proposition 2 shows why.
PROPOSITION 2. The firm facing demand uncertainty never chooses a plant capacity K that guarantees the upper bound rate of return constraint (<sRK) will be binding for all q such that f(x)>0. The profit maximizing plant size will always be larger than any plant size that guarantees that the constraint will be binding for all q such that f>0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Assume the contrary, i.e., at K, 41 < qL < qt? 72.
Then by the first order condition (11) when demand is uncertain (i.e., x2>xI) we hav w _X2 have K = s(F(x)-F(x')) >0, and thus K cannot be optimal. Q. E. D.
On reflection, this result is quite consistent with intuition. For at least an infinitesimal increase of K beyond K, the firm remains able to earn additional profits of s(K -K), with only a very small probability that the firm will not be able to operate on the maximum profit constraint. Thus, K cannot be an optimum. Expected profits can be increased by increasing the plant size.
For purposes of comparison with Proposition 2, it is of interest to characterize somewhat more finely the choice of capacity by the regulated firm operating under certainty and subject to upper and lower constraints on profits. Proposition 3 identifies certain basic properties of the choice of capacity. PROPOSITION 3. Given a regulated firin operating under demand certainty and with Tc(PO, Eq(P0), K)>O for some K, then (i) the firm never chooses K= K such that PO is changed; (ii) thefirmi selects K as the largest K such that TC(PO, Ep(Po), K) =sK, if such a choice is feasible, and (iii) if no K satisfies Tc(P0, Eq(P0), K) =sK, then the firm acts to minimize cost in satisfying the common carrier requirement at PO. (For proof see the Appendix.)
This proposition is again quite in line with intuition. In a world of certainty, and with an inelastic demand, the firm would not want a lower price since that would reduce revenues, and more importantly, profits. A higher price is not desirable since the firm could only receive such a price if it would earn no supernormal profits at the higher price. Thus, the firm will operate to maximize profits given P0, and hence given revenues as well. Parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition follow directly. The firm will want to select capital that permits it to operate on the maximum profit constraint if that is possible. If such a choice of capital is not possible, then profit maximization is equivalent to cost minimization since revenues are fixed.
The comparison of capacity choices by the regulated firm between the certainty and uncertainty cases is now complete. The firm facing demand uncertainty will not necessarily choose a larger plant capacity than it would in the uncertainty case. Under uncertainty, the firm does not choose a plant size that makes the upper constraint binding for all q that may be observed; under demand certainty, the firm will choose a capacity that makes the upper constraint binding where this is feasible, but it will not choose a plant size such that a change from P0 occurs, so long as 7c(P0, Eq(P0), K)>O for some K. If m(P0, Eq(P0), K)<O for every K, then the choice of plant size is indeterminate, with every such choice leading to zero profits for the firm.
It is clear from all that has been said so far that only under very special assumptions can anything definite be said about the amount of capacity that will be chosen under uncertainty relative to that chosen under certainty. A natural question would be whether there exists a set of sufficient conditions under which it is possible to order the levels of capacity chosen under certainty and uncertainty.
Our examination of this question leads us to Proposition 4. PROPOSITION 4. Given any interval (q , qu), necessary and sufficient conditions that the choice of capital K under uncer-tainty be less (greater) than the choice of capital K under certainty for all probability density functions f(.) over the interval are (i) q o< qL < q < q4?' or qL < q? < q, anid
(ii) 7r* be concave (convex) in q over the interval.
Proposition 4 thus has the virtue of providing both necessary and sufficient conditions under which Ki and K can be ordered. It also indicates that only in the case when the regulated firm acts as an unregulated firm (i.e., no price adjustments occur as the firm hits a regulatory floor or perceives pressure from the possibility of earning a return so high that a rate review would be triggered by interest groups) that we can say anything definite about the relative amounts of capital that would be installed under certainty and uncertainty.
PREFERENCES BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY
One might ask whether a firm subject to the non-negativity of profits constraint and the upper bound constraint on profits prefers certainty to uncertainty.
We compare expected profits under demand uncertainty with profits under certainty given that demand is the expected value of demand under uncertainty.
As above, let qL and q4 be the inf and sup of the values of q. Let K denote the level of capital that maximizes expected profits under uncertainty, and let K denote the level of capital that maximizes profits under certainty. Let q, 73 denote the values of q?, q3, given P0 and K. (ii) if qL<40 or 43<q q, then there exist probability density functions such that uncertainty is preferred to certainty, and there exist probability density functions such that this preference is reversed. (For proof, see the Appendix).
A graphical explanation of this proposition can be provided with the aid of Figure 2 . When condition (i) holds, the profit function g* is concave in q, which is uncertain. Hence, the firm prefers certainty to uncertainty. However, when (ii) holds, then 7r* is neither concave nor convex, and thus no ranking is possible.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis of the impact of demand uncertainty on the choice of plant capacity by a regulated firm does not provide a definitive answer to the question: "Will the regulated firm choose more capacity when faced with demand uncertainty than it does when demand is certain?" Instead, generally the ranking of capacity choices depends upon the subjective probability distribution over demand and on the form of the demand and production functions. The same indeterminacy surfaces with respect to preferences of the regulated firm between demand certainty and uncertainty. However, certain characteristics of capacity choices under demand certainty and uncertainty can be identified; those are summarized in Propositions 2 and 3 above.
The conclusions we have derived rest upon a model of the regulated firm that is based on Joskow's observations concerning the regulatory process, and in particular, on a model which recognizes the relevancy of non-negativity of profits as a constraint on the price-setting process. While the analysis assumes expected profit maximizing firms, the major conclusions concerning indeterminacy of preferences between uncertainty and certainty, and concerning the ranking of capacity choices, clearly extend to the case of risk averse firms as well. APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. To establish (i), note that if 7r(P0, Eq(PO), K) >0 for some K, then P is never increased, since P is increased only when the PUC acts, and when the PUC acts, profits are set equal to zero. In effect, the firm chooses K and P to maximize profits, where P=P0-P2, P>O. Formally, the firm solves the problem max 7r(P0 -P, Eq(P0 -P), K) R(Po -P) -wL(Eq(P0 -P), K) -rK (K, P) subject to wL(Eq(P0 -P), K) + (s + r)K -R(Po-P) > 0, where R(Po -P) is revenue, that is, R(Po -P) = (P0 -P)Eq(P0 -P). The constraint states that profits cannot exceed sK. We form the Lagrangean H, with the multiplier A corresponding to the constraint. For simplicity, the arguments of R and L are suppressed. Thus, H = (R-wL-rK) + A(wL+(s+r)K-R).
The first order conditions include the following at an interior optimum (K>0):
HK -wLK-r + A(wLK? + (s + r)) = 0, and HP = RP-wLP + A(wLp -Rp) < 0, PHP = 0, P20.
We wish to show that P=0. Assume the contrary so that P>0. Then Hp = 0 implies that (1 -A)(Rp -wL) =0. LF >0 and Rp <0 since demand is inelastic.
Thus, 1 -A = 0. But from HK = 0, this implies s = 0. This contradiction estabishes (i).
It remains to establish (ii) and (iii). With P=0, revenue is fixed at R(PO) with output being Eq(P0). Suppose that the firm can minimize the cost of producing Eq(P0) without violating the upper bound constraint. If so, A=0 and the firm acts as an unconstrained profit maximizer given P0.
On the other hand, if minimizing cost violates the upper bound constraint, the firm increases K to meet the constraint rather than change P0. Thus, (ii) and PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. To prove (i), we use Jensen's Inequality and the fact that g* is concave in q on the interval (qL, q,,) given KI (see Figure 2) . Thus, Ef(7*(q, K)) < 7*(Ef(q), K) < m*(Ef(q), K) for all pdf's f. The first inequality is strict, since Proposition 2 shows that ql ? qL < q4 < q2 is not possible at K. The second inequality simply expresses the fact that K is the maximizer of profits under certainty.
For (ii), we note that with qL < q? or q < q, the function 7t* is neither concave nor convex in q on (qL, qj), hence, no definite preference can be stated without knowledge of the specific properties of the production function, the pdf over demand, and the way in which demand responds to price.
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